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Abstract: We propose a general transformation that maps a protocol secure in an ex-
tremely weak sense (essentially in a model where no adversary is present) into a protocol
that is secure against a fully active adversary which interacts with an unbounded number
of protocol sessions, and has absolute control over the network. The transformation works
for arbitrary protocols with any number of participants, written with usual cryptographic
primitives. Our transformation provably preserves a large class of security properties that
contains secrecy and authenticity.
An important byproduct contribution of this paper is a modular protocol development
paradigm where designers focus their effort on an extremely simple execution setting – se-
curity in more complex settings being ensured by our generic transformation. Conceptually,
the transformation is very simple, and has a clean, well motivated design. Each message
is tied to the session for which it is intended via digital signatures and on-the-fly gener-
ated session identifiers, and prevents replay attacks by encrypting the messages under the
recipient’s public key.
Key-words: security protocols, signatures, public-key encryption
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Synthe`se de protocoles suˆrs
Re´sume´ : Nous proposons une transformation ge´ne´rale pour synthe´tiser des protocoles
suˆrs par construction. Notre transformation part d’un protocole suˆr en un sens tre`s faible
(le protocole doit eˆtre suˆr simplement lorsqu’il est exe´cute´ une seule fois et sans adversaire)
et produit un protocole suˆr contre un adversaire controˆlant tous les e´changes de messages
sur le re´seau durant un nombre illimite´ de sessions. Cette transformation fonctionne pour
des protocoles arbitraires, avec un nombre quelconque de participants et des primitives
cryptographiques usuelles. Nous prouvons la se´curite´ des protocoles synthe´tise´s pour une
large classe de proprie´te´ incluant le secret et l’authentification.
Mots-cle´s : protocoles de se´curite´, signatures, chiffrement publique
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1 Introduction
Cryptographic protocols are small programs designed to ensure secure communications over
an untrusted network. Their security is of crucial importance due to their widespread use in
critical systems and in day-to-day life. Unfortunately, designing and analyzing such protocols
is a notoriously difficult and error-prone task, largely due to the potentially unbounded
behavior of malicious agents.
In this paper we contribute to a popular technique that has been developed to cope
with this problem. Under the paradigm that we study, one can start with the design of a
simple version of a system intended to work in restricted environments (i.e. with restricted
adversaries) and then obtain, via a generic transformation, a much stronger system intended
to work in arbitrary environments. More specifically, we introduce one such transformation
that takes as input a protocol that is secure (in a sense that we discuss below) in a single
execution of the protocol, with no adversary present (not even a passive eavesdropper).
The output of the transformation is a protocol that withstands a realistic adversary with
absolute control of the communication between an unbounded number of protocol sessions.
The details of our transformation are useful to understand how security is translated from
the simple to the more complex setting.
Our transformation. At a high level, the transformation works by bounding messages
to sessions using digital signatures on messages concatenated with dynamically generated
session identifiers, and hiding messages from the adversary using public key encryption.
More specifically, the transformation is as follows. Consider a protocol with k participants
A1, . . . , Ak and n exchanges of messages.
Ai1 → Aj1 : m1
...
Ain → Ajn : mn
The transformed protocol starts with a preliminary phase, where each participant broadcasts
a fresh nonce to all others participants. Intuitively, the concatenation of the nonces with
the identities of the participants forms a session identifier.
A1 → All : N1
...
Ak → All : Nk
Let sessionID = 〈A1, A2, . . . , Ak, N1, N2, . . . , Nk〉. The remainder of the protocol works
roughly as the original one except that each message is sent together with a signature on
the message concatenated with the session identifier, and the whole construct is encrypted
INRIA
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under the recipient’s public key:
Ai1 → Aj1 : {[m1, [[m1, p1, sessionID]]sk(Ai1 )]}pk(Aj1 )
...
Ain → Ajn : {[mn, [[mn, pn, sessionID]]sk(Ain )]}pk(Ajn )
where the pi’s are the current control points in the participant’s programs. We write [[m]]sk(A)
for the message m tied with its signature with the signing key of A and {[m]}pk(A) for the
encryption of m under the public encryption key of A.
Security preservation. Intuitively, our transformation ensures that the messages of the
protocol sent between honest parties in any given session of the original protocol, cannot
be learned and/or blindly replayed by the adversary to unsuspecting users in other protocol
sessions. Indeed, the adversary cannot impersonate users in honest sessions (since in this
case it would need to produce digital signatures on their behalf), and cannot learn secrets
by replaying messages from one session to another (since messages are encrypted, and any
blindly replayed message would be rejected due to un-matching session identifiers).
It is essentially this property that ensures that security properties that hold in single
executions with no adversary present also hold in the stronger, fully active adversary model.
Although the transformation does not preserve all imaginable security properties (for ex-
ample, any anonymity that the original protocol might enjoy is lost due to the use of public
key encryption) it does preserve several interesting properties. In particular, we exhibit a
class of logic formulas which, if satisfied in single executions of the original protocol are
also satisfied by the transformed protocol in the presence of active adversaries. The class
that we consider includes standard formulations for secrecy and authentication (for example
injective agreement [13] and several other variants).
Simple protocol design. Our transformation enables more modular and manageable
protocol development. One can start by building a protocol with the desirable properties
built-in, and bearing in mind that no adversary is actually present. Then, the final protocol
is obtained using the transformation that we propose. We remark that designers can easily
deal with the case of single session and it is usually the more involved setting (multi-party,
many-session) that causes the real problems. As an example, we show how to derive a simple
protocol for authentication later in the paper. Our transformation can be applied to any
kind of protocols, with any number of participants (although, the number of participants in
each session should not be too large for efficiency).
Simple protocol verification. In standard protocol design, the potentially unbounded
behavior of malicious agents makes verification of protocols is an extremely difficult task.
Even apparently simple security properties like secrecy are undecidable in general [8]. One
obvious approach to enable verifiability is to consider restrictions to smaller protocol classes.
For example, it can be shown that for finite number of parallel sessions secrecy preservation
RR n
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is co-NP-complete [16]. Most automatic tools are based on this assumption, which is often
sufficient to discover new attacks but does not allow in general to prove security properties.
It is also possible to ensure verifiability of protocols even for unbounded number of sessions
by restricting the form of messages, and/or the ability to generate new nonces, e.g. [8, 3, 4],
but only a few such results do not make this unreasonably strong assumption [14, 15].
For the class of protocols obtained via our transformation, security verification is sig-
nificantly trivialised. Indeed, for a single, honest execution, security is in fact closer to
correctness, and should be easily carried out automatically.
Related work. The kind of modular design paradigm that we propose is rather pervasive
in cryptographic design. For example, Goldreich, Micali, and Wigderson show how to com-
pile arbitrary protocols secure against participants that honestly follow the protocol (but
may try to learn information they are not entitled to) into protocols secure against partic-
ipants that may arbitrarily deviate from the protocol [9]. Bellare, Canetti, and Krawczyk
have shown how to transform a protocol that is secure when the communication between
parties is authenticated into one that remains secure when this assumption is not met [2].
All of the above transformations have a different goal, apply to protocols that need to satisfy
stronger requirements than ours, and are also different in their design.
Our work is inspired by a recent compiler introduced by Katz and Yung [11] which
transforms any group key exchange protocol secure against a passive adversary into one
secure against an active adversary. Their transformation is, in some sense, simpler since
they do not require that the messages in the transformed protocol are encrypted. However,
their transformation is also weaker since although it requires that the protocol be secure
against passive adversaries, these adversaries still can corrupt parties adaptively (even after
the execution has finished). Furthermore, while their transformation is sufficient for the case
of group key exchange, it fails to guarantee the transfer of more general security properties.
The reason for the failure is that an adversary can obtain a message (e.g. a ciphertext) from
a session with only honest participants, and get information about the message (e.g. the
underlying plaintext) by replaying it in some other sessions for which he can produce the
necessary digital signatures. We further discuss and compare the two transformations via
an illustrative example in Section 2.
Our transformation might be viewed as a way of transforming protocols into fail-stop
protocols, introduced by Gong and Syverson [10], where any interference of an attacker is
immediately observed and causes the execution to stop. But for fail-stop protocols, it is still
necessary to consider the security issues related to the presence of passive adversaries. Here
we achieve more since we obtain directly secure protocols. Moreover, a major difference is
that we provide formal proof of the security of the resulting protocols while the approach
of [10] is rather a methodology for prudent engineering. In particular, there are no proved
guarantees on the security of the resulting protocols.
Datta, Derek, Mitchell, and Pavlovic [7] propose a methodology for modular development
of protocols where security properties are added to a protocol through generic transforma-
tions. In contrast, our transformation starts from protocols where the security property is
INRIA
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built-in. Abadi, Gonthier, and Fournet give a compiler for programs written in a language
with abstractions for secure channels into an implementation that uses cryptography [1] and
is similar to ours in the sense that it aims to eliminate cryptographic security analysis in
involved settings. However the overall goal is different.
Outline of the paper. The next section contains an example which illustrates the dif-
ferences between the compiler of Katz and Yung and our compiler. In Section 3 we present
the model in which we reason about security protocols. Section 4 introduces a simple logic
and defines security properties within this logic. The protocol transformation is presented
in Section 5. Finally, in Section 6 we present our main transfer result and sketch its proof,
and then we conclude and give a few directions for future work.
2 Comparison with the Katz and Yung’s compiler
Consider the following simple protocol where an agent A sends a session key Kab to B using
his public key. Then B acknowledges A’s message by forwarding the session key, encrypted
under A’s public key. We say that this protocol is secure if it preserves the secrecy of Kab.
A → B : {[Kab]}pk(B)
B → A : {[Kab]}pk(A)
Note that this protocol is secure when there is no adversary and is also secure even in the
presence of an eavesdropper that may read any message sent over the network but cannot
interfere in the protocol.
The resulting protocol obtained after applying Katz and Yung’s compiler is the following
one.
A → B : A, Na
B → A : B, Nb
A → B : [[{[Kab]}pk(B), A, B, Na, Nb]]sk(A)
B → A : [[{[Kab]}pk(A), A, B, Na, Nb]]sk(B)
However, the compiled protocol is not secure against an adversary that may use corrupted
identities. Note that the message [[{[Kab]}pk(B)]]sk(A) entirely reveals the message {[Kab]}pk(B).
We assume that the adversary owns a corrupted identity I . The attack works as follows.
(1).1 A → B : A, Na
(1).2 B → A : B, Nb
(1).3 A → B : [[{[Kab]}pk(B), A, B, Na, Nb]]sk(A)
(2).1 I → B : I, Ni
(2).2 B → I : B, N ′b
(2).3 I → B : [[{[Kab]}pk(B), I, B, Ni, N
′
b]]sk(I)
(2).4 B → I : [[{[Kab]}pk(I), I, B, Ni, N
′
b]]sk(B)
This allows the intruder to learn any session key used between two honest agents.
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In contrast, after applying our own transformation, the resulting protocol would be secure
for an unbounded number of sessions, against a fully active attacker.
3 Protocols
In this section we give a language for specifying protocols and define their execution in
the presence of passive and active adversaries. For simplicity of presentation, we use a
model that does not directly capture probabilistic primitives. Nevertheless, our theorems
and proofs easily extend to a model that models randomness explicitly (e.g. through the
use of labels as in [6]).
3.1 Syntax
We consider protocols specified in a language similar to the one of [6] allowing parties to
exchange messages built from identities and randomly generated nonces using asymmetric
and symmetric encryption and digital signatures.
Consider the algebraic signature Σ with the following sorts. A sort ID for agent identities,
sorts SigKey, VerKey, AsymEKey, AsymDKey, SymKey containing keys for signing, verifying,
public-key encryption, public-key decryption, and symmetric encryption algorithms. The
algebraic signature also contains sorts Nonce, Ciphertext, Signature, and Pair for nonces,
ciphertexts, signatures, and pairs, respectively. The sort Term is a supersort containing,
besides all other sorts enumerated above, a sort Int for integers having Z as the support
set. There are eight operations: the four operations ek, dk, sk, vk are defined on the sort
ID and return the asymmetric encryption key, asymmetric decryption key, signing key, and
verification key associated to the input identity. The other operations that we consider are
pairing, public and symmetric key encryption, and signing. Their ranges and domains are
as follows.
  〈 , 〉 : Term× Term → Pair
  {[ ]} : AsymEKey× Term → Ciphertext
  { } : SymKey × Term → Ciphertext
  [[ ]] : SigKey× Term → Signature
Let X.a, X.n, X.k, X.c, X.s, X.t be sets of variables of sort agent, nonce, (symmetric) key,
ciphertext, signature and term respectively, and X = X.a ∪ X.n ∪ X.k ∪ X.c ∪ X.s ∪ X.t.
Protocols are specified using the terms in TΣ(X) of the free algebra generated by X over
the signature Σ. We suppose that pairing is left associative and write 〈m1, m2, . . . , ml〉 for
〈〈〈m1, m2〉, m3〉 . . . , ml〉. When unambiguous, we may omit the brackets.
Throughout the paper we fix a constant k ∈ N that represents the number of protocol
participants and we write [k] for the set {1, 2, . . . , k}. Furthermore, without loss of generality,
INRIA
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we fix the set of agent variables to be X.a = {A1, A2, . . . , Ak }, and partition the set of nonce
(and key) variables, according to the party that generates them. Formally:
X.n = ∪A∈X.aXn(A) where Xn(A) = {N
j
A | j ∈ N}
X.k = ∪A∈X.aXk(A) where Xk(A) = {K
j
A | j ∈ N}
This partition avoids to have to specify later which of the nonces (symmetric keys) are
generated by the party executing the protocol, or are expected to be received from other
parties.
Roles and protocols. The messages that are sent by participants are specified using
terms inTΣ(X). The individual behavior of each protocol participant is defined by a role
describing a sequence of message reception/transmission which we call steps or rules. A
k-party protocol consists of k such roles together with an association that maps each step
of a role that expects some message m to the step of the role where the message m is
produced. Notice that this association essentially defines how the execution of a protocol
should proceed in the absence of an adversary.
Definition 1 (Roles and protocols) The set of roles is defined by Roles =
(
({ init } ∪
TΣ(X))×(TΣ(X)∪{ stop })
)∗
. A k-party protocol is a pair Π = (R,S) where R is a mapping
R : [k] → Roles that maps i ∈ [k] to the role executed by the i’th protocol participant and
S : [k]×Z ↪→ [k]×Z is a partial mapping that returns for each role-control point pair (r, p),
the role-control point pair (r′, p′) = S(r, p) which emits the message to be processed by role
r at step p.
We assume that a protocol specification is such that the r’th role of the protocol R(r) =
((rcv1r, snt
1
r), (rcv
2
r , snt
2
r), . . .), is executed by player Ar. Informally, the above definition says
that at step p, Ar expects to receive a message of the form specified by rcv
p
r and returns the
message sntpr . It is important to notice that the terms rcv
p
r and snt
p
r are not actual messages
but specify how the message that is received and the message that is output should look
like. We note that for technical reasons we sometimes use negative control points (with
negatively indexed role rules).
Example 1 The Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol [12]
A → B : {[Na, A]}ek(B)
B → A : {[Na, Nb, B]}ek(A)
A → B : {[Nb]}ek(B)
is specified as follows: there are two roles R(1) and R(2) corresponding to the sender’s role
and the receiver’s role.
R(1) :
(
init, {[N1A1 , A1]}ek(A2)
)
S(1, 1) = (0, 0)(
{[N1A1 , N
1
A2
, A2]}ek(A1), {[N
1
A2
]}ek(A2)
)
S(1, 2) = (2, 1)
R(2) :
(
{[N1A1 , A1]}ek(A2), {[N
1
A1
, N1A2 , A2]}ek(A1)
)
S(2, 1) = (1, 1)(
{[N1A2 ]}ek(A2), stop
)
S(2, 2) = (1, 2)
RR n
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Executable protocols. Clearly, not all protocols written using the syntax above are
meaningful. We only consider the class of executable protocols, i.e. protocols for which
each role can be implemented in an executable program, using only the local knowledge of
the corresponding agent. This requires in particular that any sent message (corresponding
to some sntpr) is always deducible from the previously received messages (corresponding
to rcv1r, . . . , rcv
p
r). Also we demand that S is consistent, meaning for example that for a
fixed role r, S(r, p) is defined on exactly |R(r)| consecutive integers, where |S| denotes the
cardinality of the set S. A precise definition of executable protocols may found in the
Appendix A.
3.2 Formal Execution Model
We start with the description of the execution model of the protocol in the presence of
an active attacker. The model that we consider is rather standard. The parties in the
system execute a (potentially unbounded) number of protocol sessions with each other. The
communication is under the complete control of the adversary who can intercept, drop, or
modify the messages on the network.
The messages transmitted between parties are terms of the algebra Tf freely generated
over the signature Σ by an arbitrary fixed set of identities TfID together with the sets for
types SymKey and Nonce defined by:
T
f
SymKey = {k
a,j,s | a ∈ TfID, j ∈ N, s ∈ N} ∪ {k
j | j ∈ N}
T
f
Nonce = {n
a,j,s | a ∈ TfID, j ∈ N, s ∈ N} ∪ {n
j | j ∈ N}
Informally, one should think of the constant ka,j,s (respectively na,j,s) as the j’th key (re-
spectively nonce) generated by party a in session s. Constants kj and nj represent keys and
nonces produced by the adversary.
To each protocol we associate the set of its valid execution traces. First we clarify what
execution traces are and then present the association.
A global state of an execution is given by a triple (SId, f, H). Here, SId is the set of role
session ids currently executed by protocol participants, f is a global assignment function
that keeps track of the local state of each existing session and H is the set of messages that
have been sent on the network so far.
More precisely, each session id is a tuple of the form (s, r, (a1, a2, . . . , ak)), where s ∈ N
is a unique identifier for the session, r is the index of the role that is executed in the session
and a1, a2, . . . , ak ∈ T
f
ID are the identities of the parties that are involved in the session. We
write SID for the set (N× N× (TfID)
k
) of all session ids.
Mathematically, the global assignment f is a function f : SId → ([X ↪→ Tf ] × N × Z),
where SId ⊆ SID represents the session ids initialized in the execution. For each such session
id sid ∈ SId, f(sid) = (σ, r, p) returns its local state. Here, r is the same role index as in sid,
the function σ is a substitution, that is a partial instantiation of the variables of the role
R(r) and p ∈ Z is the control point of the program. We sometimes write Xσ for σ(X). We
denote by GA the set [SID ↪→ ([X ↪→ Tf ]× N× Z)] of all possible global assignments.
INRIA
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Finally, the messages that may be sent on the network can be essentially any element of
Tf , so we write Msgs for the set 2T
f
(where 2S denotes the power set of S).
An execution trace is a sequence
(S0, f0, H0)
α1−→ (S1, f1, H1)
α2−→ . . .
αn−−→ (Sn, fn, Hn)
such that for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n, (Si, fi, Hi) ∈ (2SID × GA × Msgs) and αi is one of the
actions corrupt,new, and send with appropriate parameters that we clarify below. This
corresponds to the intuition that transitions between two global states are caused by actions
of the adversary who can corrupt users, initiate new sessions of the protocol between users
that he chooses, and send messages to existing sessions.
For a fixed protocol k-party Π, the transitions between global states are as follows:
  The adversary can corrupt agents: (SId, f, H)
corrupt(a1,...,al)
−−−−−−−−−−−→ (SId, f, H ′) where a1, . . . , al ∈
T
f
ID and H
′ = ∪1≤j≤lkn(aj) ∪ H . Here, kn(aj) denotes the knowledge of aj : if
A is a variable, or a constant of sort agent, we define its knowledge by kn(A) =
{dk(A), sk(A)} i.e. an agent knows its secret decryption and signing key. The adver-
sary corrupts parties by outputting a set of identities. In return, the adversary receives
the secret keys corresponding to the identities. In this paper we are only concerned
with the case of static corruption so this transition only occurs at the beginning of an
execution trace.
  The adversary can initiate new sessions: (SId, f, H)
new(r,a1,...,ak)
−−−−−−−−−−→ (SId′, f ′, H) where
1 ≤ r ≤ k, a1, . . . , ak ∈ T
f
ID, and f
′ and SId′ are defined as follows. Let s = |SId|+ 1,
be the session identifier of the new session. Then SId′ = SId∪{(s, r, (a1, . . . , ak))} and
the function f ′ is defined by:
– f ′(sid) = f(sid) for every sid ∈ SId.
– f ′(s, r, (a1, . . . , ak)) = (σ, r, p0) where p0 is the initial control point of role
1 r and
σ is a partial function σ : X ↪→ Tf defined by

σ(Aj) = aj 1 ≤ j ≤ k
σ(N jAr ) = n
ar,j,s j ∈ N
σ(KjAr ) = k
ar,j,s j ∈ N
We recall that the principal that executes role R(r) is represented by variable
Ar thus, in that role, every variable of the form X
j
Ar
represents a nonce or a
symmetric key generated by Ar.
  The adversary can send messages to existing sessions: (SId, f, H)
send(sid,m)
−−−−−−−→ (SId, f ′, H ′)
where sid ∈ SId and m ∈ Tf . H ′ and f ′ are defined as follows. We define f ′(sid′) =
1The initial control point p0 is usually 1, but for technical reasons it may also be some other integer.
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 
6166
12 V. Cortier, B. Warinschi & E. Za˘linescu
m ∈ S
S ` m
j ∈ N
S ` a, ek(a), vk(a), kj , nj
Initial knowledge
S ` m1 S ` m2
S ` 〈m1 , m2〉
S ` 〈m1 , m2〉
i ∈ {1, 2}
S ` mi
Pairing and unpairing
S ` k S ` m
S ` {m}
k
S ` {m}
k
S ` k
S ` m
Sym. encryption and decryption
S ` ek(a) S ` m
S ` {[m]}ek(a)
S ` {[m]}ek(a) S ` dk(a)
S ` m
Asym. encryption and decryption
S ` sk(a) S ` m
S ` [[m]]sk(a)
S ` [[m]]sk(a)
S ` m
Signature
Figure 1: Deduction rules for the formal adversary. In the above, a ∈ TfID.
f(sid′) for every sid′ ∈ SId \ {sid}. Let f(sid) = (σ, r, p) for some σ, r and p, and let
R(r) =
(
(rcv1r , snt
1
r), . . . , (rcv
kr
r , snt
kr
r )
)
be the role executed in this session. There are
two cases:
– Either there exists a substitution σ′ such that m = rcvprσ
′ and σ′ extends σ, that
is, Xσ′ = Xσ whenever σ is defined on X . Then f ′(sid) = (σ′, r, p + 1) and
H ′ = H ∪ {sntprσ
′}. We say that m is accepted.
– Or we define f ′(sid) = f(sid) and H ′ = H (the state remains unchanged).
As usual, we are only interested in valid execution traces – those traces where the ad-
versary only sends messages that he can compute out of his knowledge and the messages it
had seen on the network. The adversary can derive new information using the relation `.
Intuitively, S ` m means that the adversary is able to compute the message m from the set
of messages S; the adversarial abilities are captured by the definition in Figure 1. The only
rule that is perhaps less standard is the last one. It essentially states that out of a signature
an adversary could compute the message that is signed, which is theoretically possible for
any secure digital signature scheme.
The set of valid execution traces is formally described by the following definition.
Definition 2 (Valid execution traces) An execution trace (SId0, f0, H0) −→ . . . −→ (SIdn, fn, Hn)
is valid if
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  H0 = SId0 = ∅, (SId0, f0, H0) → (SId1, f1, H1) for one of the three transitions described
above and for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (SIdi, fi, Hi) → (SIdi+1, fi+1, Hi+1) for one of the last
two transitions described above;
  moreover, the messages sent by the adversary can be computed using `, that is whenever
(SIdi, fi, Hi)
send(sid,m)
−−−−−−−→ (SIdi+1, fi+1, Hi+1) it holds that Hi ` m.
Given a protocol Π, we write Exec(Π) for the set of valid execution traces of Π.
Example 2 Playing with the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol described in Example 1, an
adversary can corrupt an agent a3, start a new session for the second role with players
a1, a2 and send the message {[n(a3, 1, 1), a1]}ek(a2) to the player of the second role. The
corresponding valid trace execution is:
(∅, f1, ∅)
corrupt(a3)
−−−−−−−−→ (∅, f1,kn(a3))
new(2,a1,a2)
−−−−−−−−→ ({sid1}, f2,kn(a3))
send(sid1,{[n3,a1]}ek(a2))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
(
{sid1}, f3,kn(a3) ∪ {{[n3, n2, a2]}ek(a1)}
)
,
where sid1 = (1, 2, (a1, a2)), n2 = n(a2, 1, 1), n3 = n(a3, 1, 1), and f2, f3 are defined as
follows: f2(sid1) = (σ1, 2, 1), f3(sid1) = (σ2, 2, 2) where σ1(A1) = a1, σ1(A2) = a2,
σ1(N
1
A2
) = n2, and σ2 extends σ1 by σ2(N
1
A1
) = n3.
Given an arbitrary trace tr = (SId0, f0, H0)
α1−→ . . .
αn−−→ (SIdn, fn, Hn) with n ∈ N, we de-
fine the set of corrupted agents of a trace tr by CA(tr) = {a1, . . . , al} if α1 = corrupt(a1, . . . , al)
and CA(tr) = ∅ otherwise. The set SIdh(tr) of honest session identifiers is the set of session
identifiers that correspond to sessions between non-corrupt agents:
SIdh(tr) = {sid ∈ SIdn | sid = (s, r, (a1, . . . , ak)), CA(tr) ∩ {a1, . . . , ak} = ∅}.
Also, for a trace tr we denote by I(tr) the set of indexes i of the transitions and global
states of tr. For example the above trace has I(tr) = {0, 1, . . . , n}. If sid is a session id then
we denote by Ag(sid) the set of agents involved in this session, that is Ag(sid) = {a1, . . . , ak}
when sid = (·, ·, (a1, . . . , ak)).
4 Security properties
We use a simple logic introduced in [5] to express security properties for protocols specified
in the language given in the previous section. We recall this logic, define its semantics and
provide several examples of security properties that can be expressed within these logic.
4.1 A logic for security properties
We define the set of local states of a trace tr = (SIdi, fi, Hi)1≤i≤n for role r at step p by
LSr,p(tr) = {(σ, r, p) | ∃i ∈ [n], ∃sid ∈ SIdi, s.t. fi(sid) = (σ, r, p)}.
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We assume an infinite set XSub of meta-variables for substitutions. The logic contains tests
between terms where variables are substituted by variable substitutions. More formally, let
TSub be the algebra defined by:
TSub ::= ς(X) | g(TSub) | h(TSub, TSub)
where ς ∈ XSub, X ∈ X, and g, h ∈ Σ of arity 1 and 2 respectively.
Besides standard propositional connectors, the logic has a predicate to specify honest
agents, equality and inequality tests between terms, and existential and universal quantifiers
over the local states of agents.
Definition 3 The formulas of the logic L are defined by induction as follows:
φ(tr) ::= NC(tr, ς(A)) | t1 = t2 | ¬φ(tr) | φ(tr) ∧ φ(tr) | φ(tr) ∨ φ(tr)
| ∀LSr,p(tr).ς φ(tr) | ∃LSr,p(tr).ς φ(tr) | ∃!LSr,p(tr).ς φ(tr)
where tr is a parameter of the formula, A ∈ X.a, ς ∈ XSub, t1, t2 ∈ TSub and r, p ∈ N. As
usual, we may use φ1 ⇒ φ2 as a shortcut for ¬φ1 ∨ φ2.
Here the predicate NC(tr, ς(A)) of arity 2 is used to specify non corrupted agents. The
quantifications ∀LSr,p(tr).ς and ∃LSr,p(tr).ς are over local states of agent r at step p in
trace tr, and they bound the variable substitution ς . The semantics of our logic is defined for
closed formula as follows: standard propositional connectors and negation are interpreted
as usual. Equality is syntactic equality. The interpretation of quantifiers and the predicate
NC is shown in Figure 2.
A security property φ should be seen in this paper as an abstraction of the form φ ,
λtr.φ(tr), where the tr parameter is used only to define the semantics of such formulas. By
abuse of notation we therefore ignore this parameter and write φ ∈ L for a security property.
Informally, a protocol Π satisfies φ if φ(tr) is true for all traces of Π. Formally:
Definition 4 (Satisfiability) Let Π be a protocol and φ ∈ L be a security property. We
say that Π satisfies the security property φ, and write Π |= φ if for any trace tr ∈ Exec(Π),
[[φ(tr)]] = 1.
4.2 Examples of security properties
In this section we show how to specify secrecy and several variants of authentication, in-
cluding those from Lowe’s hierarchy [13], in the given security logic.
4.2.1 A secrecy property.
Let Π be a k-party executable protocol. To specify our secrecy property we use a standard
encoding. Namely, we add a role to the protocol, R(k + 1) = (Y, stop), where Y is a new
variable of sort Term. It can be seen as some sort of witness as it does nothing but waits for
receiving a public data.
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[[NC(tr, a)]] =


1 if a does not appear in a corrupt action,
i.e. if e1
corrupt(a1,...,al)
−−−−−−−−−−−→ e2, where tr = (e1, e2, . . . , en),
we have a 6= ai, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ l,
0 otherwise
[[∀LSr,p(tr).ς φ(tr)]] =
{
1 if ∀(σ, r, p) ∈ LSr,p(tr), we have [[φ(tr)[σ/ς ]]] = 1,
0 otherwise.
[[∃LSr,p(tr).ς φ(tr)]] =
{
1 if ∃(σ, r, p) ∈ LSr,p(tr), s.t. [[φ(tr)[σ/ς ]]] = 1,
0 otherwise.
[[∃!LSr,p(tr).ς φ(tr)]] =


1 if ∃! sid ∈ SId(tr), ∃i ∈ I(tr) s.t.
fi(sid) = (σ, r, p) and [[φ(tr)[
σ/ς ]]] = 1,
0 otherwise.
Figure 2: Interpretation of formulas in L.
Informally, the definition of the secrecy property φs states that, for any local state of
an agent playing role r in which a nonce (or a key) X was created in an honest session, a
witness (i.e. an agent playing role k + 1) cannot gain any knowledge on X . Formally, the
property is specified by the following formula:
φs(tr) = ∀LSr,1(tr).ς
( ∧
l∈[k]
NC(tr, ς(Al)) ⇒ ∀LSk+1,2(tr).ς ′
(
ς(X) 6= ς ′(Y )
))
As a side remark, notice that we could model also the secrecy of a data X that is received
in an honest session: we would simply specify the control point p (instead of 1) at which the
date is received by the role r. Moreover, in both cases (that is, X created or received) the
formula is always true for honest, single session traces. It will follow that our transformation
preserves secrecy of all nonces or keys used in sessions that involve only honest parties.
4.2.2 Authentication properties
We show two formulations for authentication, one for the two-party case, and a second one
for the multi-party case.
We show how to use the logic defined above to specify the injective agreement [13]
between two parties A and B. Informally, this property states that whenever an A completes
a run of the protocol, apparently with B, then there is unique run of B apparently with A
such that two agents agree on the values of some fixed variables, provided that A and B are
honest. As usual nothing is guaranteed in sessions involving corrupted agents.
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Let p1 be the length of A’s role and p2 be the control point at which B should have
received all data items from A. Then, the above intuition is captured by the following
formula:
φa(tr) , ∀LS1,p1(tr).ς
(
NC(tr, Aς) ∧ NC(tr, Bς) ⇒
∃!LS2,p2(tr).ς
′
(
(Aς = Aς ′) ∧ (Bς = Bς ′) ∧
∧
1≤i≤n
(Xiς = Xiς
′)
))
It is straightforward to modify this formula in order to obtain formulas corresponding to
the other variants of authentication from Lowe’s hierarchy: to obtain non-injective agreement
one should use ∃ instead of ∃!. To obtain weak agreement one would require equality only on
the identities of agents; and finally, to obtain aliveness, one would need only that (Bς = Bς ′).
We give the full specifications of these properties in Appendix D.
4.2.3 Multi-party authentication
We model a simple security property for the multi-party case by requiring that each party
authenticates any other party in the sense that each agent is convinced that the other agents
were alive in the session. In our logic, this translates to the formula:
φma(tr) =
∧
i∈[k]
φma(i, tr)
with
φma(r, tr) , ∀LSr,pr (tr).ς
( ∧
l∈[k]
NC(tr, Alς) ⇒
∧
i∈[k],i6=r
(
∃LS i,1(tr).ςi
∧
j∈[k]
(Aj ς = Ajςi)
))
where for each role r pr is its final control point. We could enforce the property as for the
two-party case by changing the set of equalities that should hold.
5 Transformation of protocols
The core idea of the transformation is to have parties agree on some common, dynamically
generated, session identifier s, and then transmit the encryption of a message m of the
original protocol accompanied by a signature on m||s. As discussed in the introduction, the
transformation thus ensures that messages sent in a particular session of the protocol can
only be accepted by parties engaged in that very same session.
The modification of the source protocol is performed in two steps. We first introduce
an initialization phase, where each agent generates a fresh nonce which is distributed to
all other participants. The idea is that the concatenation of all these nonces and all the
identities involved in the session plays the role of a unique session identifier. To avoid
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underspecification of the resulting protocol we fix a particular way in which the nonces are
distributed. The resulting first phase of the transformed protocol (which we call Πinit) can
be informally described as follows:
Πinit :


A1 → A2 : NA1
A2 → A3 : NA1 , NA2
...
Ak−1 → Ak : NA1 , NA2 . . . , NAk−1
Ak → Ak−1 : NA1 , NA2 . . . , NAk−1 , NAk
Ak−1 → Ak−2 : NA1 , NA2 . . . , NAk−1 , NAk
...
A2 → A1 : NA1 , NA2 . . . , NAk−1 , NAk
We remark that the precise order in which participants send these nonces does not really
matter, and we do not require that these nonces be authenticated in some way. In principle
an active adversary is allowed to forward, block or modify the messages sent during the
initialization phase, but behaviors that deviate from the intended execution of the protocol
are detected in the next phase.
In the second phase of the transformed protocol, the execution proceeds as prescribed by
Π with the difference that to each message m that needs to be sent, the sending parties also
attaches a signature [[m, p, nonces]]sk′(a) and encrypts the whole construct with the intended
receiver public key. p is the current control point and nonces is the concatenation of the
nonces received during the first phase with the identities of the participants involved in the
protocol. To avoid confusion and unintended interactions between the signatures and the
encryptions produced by the compiler and those used in the normal execution of the protocol,
the former use fresh signatures and public keys. Formally, we extend the signature Σ with
four new function symbols sk′, vk′, ek′ and dk′ which have exactly the same functionality
(that is the same sort and similar deduction rules) with sk, vk, ek and dk respectively. This
formalises the assumption that in the transformed version of Π each agent a has associated
two pairs of verification/signing keys ((vk(a), sk(a)) and (vk′(a), sk′(a))) and two pairs of
encryption/decryption keys ((ek(a), dk(a)) and (ek′(a), dk′(a))) and that these new pairs of
keys were correctly distributed previously to any execution of the protocol. We assume that
source protocols are constructed over Σ only.
Definition 5 (Transformed protocol) Let Π = (R,S) be a k-party executable protocol
such that the nonce variables N 0Ak do not appear in R (which can be ensured by renaming
the nonce variables of Π) and all the initial control points are set to 1 (which can be ensured
by rewriting the function S).
The transformed protocol Π˜ = (R˜, S˜) is defined as follows: R˜(r) = Rinit(r) · R′(r) and
S˜ = S init ∪ S where · denotes the concatenation of sequences and Rinit, R′ and S init are
RR n
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defined as follows:
Rinit(r) =
(
(noncesr−1, noncesr), (noncesk, noncesk)
)
, ∀1 ≤ r < k,
S init(r,−1) = (r − 1,−1), S init(r, 0) = (r + 1, 0), ∀1 ≤ r < k,
Rinit(k) =
(
(noncesk−1, noncesk)
)
S init(k, 0) = (k − 1,−1)
with nonces0 = init and noncesj = 〈N0A1 , N
0
A2
, . . . , N0Aj 〉 for 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
Let R(r) =
(
(rcvpr , snt
p
r)
)
p∈[kr ]
. Then R′(r) =
(
(r˜cv
p
r , s˜nt
p
r)
)
p∈[kr ]
such that
if rcvpr = init then r˜cv
p
r = fake, if snt
p
r = stop then s˜nt
p
r = stop and otherwise
r˜cv
p
r = {[rcv
p
r , [[rcv
p
r , p
′, nonces]]sk′(Ar′ )]}ek′(Ar),
s˜nt
p
r = {[snt
p
r , [[snt
p
r , p, nonces]]sk′(Ar)]}ek′(Ar′′ )
where (r′, p′) = S(r, p), (r, p) = S(r′′, p′′) and nonces = 〈A1, . . . , Ak, noncesk〉.
The initial control point is now set to −1 (or 0 for Ak) since actions have been added
for the initialization stage. This avoids shifting the control points and clarifies the relation
between actions in the original and transformed protocol.
The special message fake is used to model a fake reception or transmission. We use this
message to model the situation where an agent waits for more than one message in order to
reply or when, in response to some message, an agent sends more then one reply: so (fake, m)
and (m, fake) do not represent reception/transmission steps but only a transmission step or
respectively a reception step.
6 Main result
In this section we give our main result. We first formalise honest, single session executions
for protocols. Then we identify a fragment of the logic defined in Section 4 whose formulas
are transferred through our transformation, and then prove our transference theorem.
6.0.4 Honest, single session traces
We identify a class of executions, which we call honest, single session executions which,
intuitively, correspond to traces where just one session is executed, session in which all
parties are honest and the adversary did not interfere.
Definition 6 (Honest, single session trace) Let Π = (R,S) be a k-party protocol and
tr = (SId0, f0, H0)
α1−→ . . .
αn−−→ (SIdn, fn, Hn) be a valid trace of Π. The trace tr is an honest,
single session trace if there are k agent identities a1, . . . , ak such that
  for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, αi = new(i, a1, . . . , ak),
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  for k + 1 ≤ i ≤ n, αi = send(sid, m), m = rcv
p
rσ where fi(sid) = (σ, r, p + 1), and
there exists j < i such that fj(sid
′) = (σ′, r′, p′), S(r, p) = (r′, p′), and m = sntp
′
r′σ
′ for
some sid′.
Let Execp,1(Π) be the set of honest, single session traces of Π.
Definition 7 (Passive, single session satisfiability) Let Π be a protocol and φ ∈ L be
a security property. We say that Π satisfies the security property φ for passive adversaries
and a single session, and write Π |=p,1 φ if for any trace tr ∈ Execp,1(Π), [[φ(tr)]] = 1.
6.0.5 Transferable security properties
We now define a fragment L′ of L for which the transference result outlined above holds.
Definition 8 The set L′ consists of those formulas φ(tr) with
φ(tr) = ∀LSr,p(tr).ς
( ∧
l∈[k]
NC(tr, ς(Al)) ⇒
∧
i∈I
(
Qi LSri,pi(tr).ςi
∧
j∈Ji
τ ij (u
i
j , v
i
j)
))
where Qi ∈ {∀, ∃, ∃!}, and for all i ∈ I, for all j ∈ Ji, if Qi = ∀ then τ
i
j ∈ {6=} and if
Qi ∈ {∃, ∃!} then τ ij ∈ {=, 6=}; moreover, for each i ∈ I, if Qi = ∀ (respectively Qi = ∃!)
then for all (there is) j ∈ Ji we have that (such that τ ij ∈ {=} and) there exists at least a
subterm ς(X) in uij or v
i
j with X a nonce or key variable.
As usual, we require security properties to hold in sessions between honest agents. This
means that no guarantee is provided in a session where a corrupted agent is involved. But
this does not prevent honest agents from contacting corrupted agents in parallel sessions.
Properties that can be expressed in our fragment L′ are correspondence relations between
(data in) particular local states of agents in different sessions. It is a non-trivial class since
e.g. the logical formulas given in Section 4 for expressing secrecy and authentication are
captured by the above definition.
6.0.6 Transference result
The main result of this paper is the following transference theorem. It informally states
that the formulas of L′ that are satisfied in single, honest executions of a protocol are also
satisfied by executions of the transformed protocol in the presence of a fully active adversary.
Theorem 1 Let Π be a protocol and Π˜ the corresponding transformed protocol. Let φ ∈ L′
be a security property. Then
Π |=p,1 φ ⇒ Π˜ |= φ.
The main intuition behind the proof is a property that our transformation enjoys, namely
that any execution in the presence of an active adversary is closely mirrored by some honest
execution (i.e. an execution with no adversarial interference plus some additional useless
sessions). We define honest executions next.
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6.0.7 Honest executions
Recall that we demand that protocols come with an intended execution order, in which the
designer specifies the source of each message in an execution. Roughly, in an honest exe-
cution trace one can partition the set of session ids in sets of at most k role sessions (each
corresponding to a different role of the protocol) such that messages are exchanged only
within partitions, and the message transmission within each partition follows the intended
execution specification. Since we cannot prevent an intruder to create new messages and
sign them with corrupted signing keys, clearly the property can hold only for session iden-
tifiers corresponding to honest participants. The above ideas are captured by the following
definition.
Definition 9 (Honest execution traces) Let Π be an executable protocol. An execution
trace tr = (SId0, f0, H0)
α1−→ . . .
αn−−→ (SIdn, fn, Hn) is honest if it is valid and there is a
partition PrtSId of the honest role session identifiers SIdh(tr) such that:
1. for all S ∈ PrtSId, for all sid, sid′ ∈ S with sid 6= sid′ and sid = (s, r, (a1, . . . ak)) and
sid′ = (s′, r′, (a′1, . . . a
′
k)), we have r 6= r
′, and aj = a
′
j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k; that is, in any
protocol session each of the participants execute different roles2 and the agents agree
on their communication partners;
2. whenever (SIdi−1, fi−1, Hi−1)
send(sid,m)
−−−−−−−→ (SIdi, fi, Hi) with sid ∈ SId
h(tr), m accepted,
m 6= fake and m = rcvprσ, p ≥ 1, we have that there are sid
′ ∈ [sid] and i′ < i such that
r′ = r′′, p′ = p′′ and m = sntp
′
r′σ
′ where fi(sid) = (σ, r, p + 1), fi′(sid
′) = (σ′, r′, p′),
S(r, p) = (r′′, p′′) and [sid] denotes the partition to which sid belongs to.
We write Exech(Π) for the set of honest execution traces of Π.
Notice that the above definition considers partial executions in which not all roles finish
their execution, and where not all roles in a protocol session need to be initialized.
The following lemma states that for any transformed protocol, an active intruder cannot
interfere with the execution of honest sessions and honest sessions share the same value for
sessionID. Here, interference means that the adversary is capable to construct and send some
message (not produced by some party in the protocol) to a party, such that the party accepts
that message. Notice that we are not concerned with the possibility that the adversary may
not deliver (and therefore block) messages of a session.
Lemma 1 Let Π be a protocol and Π˜ the corresponding transformed protocol. In Π˜, any
valid execution trace is an honest execution trace.
Proof sketch: Let tr be a valid execution trace of Π˜. We construct the partition of session
ids by simply grouping session ids that have the same value of nonces; we write PrtSId(tr)
for the resulting partition. It is easy to check that PrtSId(tr) satisfies the first condition
2Consequently, each partition consists of at most k role sessions.
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of the definition of an honest execution trace. We prove that the second condition also
holds by induction on the length of the trace. Assume that (SIdi−1, fi−1, Hi−1)
send(sid,m)
−−−−−−−→
(SIdi, fi, Hi) with sid ∈ SId
h(tr), m accepted, m 6= fake and m = r˜cv
p
rσ, p ≥ 1. Then, m must
be of the form {[m′, [[m′, p, m0]]sk′(a)]}ek′(b) with a, b honest agents and the agents occurring
in m0 being honest too. Since the adversary cannot forge [[m
′, p, m0]]sk′(a), a message of the
form {[m′, [[m′, p, m0]]sk′(a)]}ek′(b′) must have been sent by the honest agent a in a session
sid′ ∈ [sid] since the two agents agree on m0. Thanks to the control point that is also signed,
we can show that a must have sent his message exactly to the agent that is expected, and
then deduce that b = b′ and a’s action also satisfies the condition on function S. 
Any nonce or key generated in an honest session is always protected by at least one
encryption with a public key of a non-corrupted agent.
Lemma 2 Let Π be a k-party protocol and Π˜ be the corresponding transformed protocol. Let
X be a nonce (or a key) variable of Π, tr be a valid execution trace of Π˜, (SId, f, H) be a
global state of tr and t be a message deducible from H, i.e. H ` t.
For any honest session id sid ∈ SIdh(tr) with f(sid) = (σ, ·, ·), for any occurrence of
Xσ in t (i.e. for any path q such that t|q = Xσ), Xσ occurs in messages of the form
m
def
= {[m′, [[m′, p, σ(nonces)]]sk(a)]}ek′(b), where b is an honest agent, i.e. b /∈ CA(tr).
Proof sketch: Using Lemma 1, we can show that the only possible values for Xσ are
nonces (or keys) generated in honest sessions. Thus Xσ is initially protected with an honest
public key encryption. Then the only way for an adversary to remove that encryption is to
send the message to an honest agent, which in turn will send it to one of the agents occurring
in σ(nonces) thus to another honest agent; still, Xσ will be protected by an honest public
key encryption. 
The next lemma says that every honest protocol session in the transformed protocol
executes exactly like an honest protocol session in the initial protocol without intruder
interference. To state this formally we need some auxiliary definitions first.
Since for a session in the transformed protocol there are more actions (corresponding to
the initial phase), we define the actions we are interested in.
Let Π be an executable protocol. For an honest trace tr = (SId0, f0, H0)
α0−→ . . .
αn−−→
(SIdn, fn, Hn) and a partition [sid] where sid ∈ SId
h(tr) we define Ix(tr, [sid]) to be the set of
indexes i such that:
  αi = new(r, a1, . . . , ak), where sid = (·, ·, (a1, . . . , ak)), or
  αi = send(sid
′, m) and sid′ ∈ [sid], m accepted, and m = rcvprσ, p ≥ 1, where fi(sid
′) =
(σ, r, p + 1).
Note that the definition of Ix(tr, [sid]) does not depend on the representant sid.
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Lemma 3 Let Π be a protocol and Π˜ the corresponding transformed protocol. Then ∀tr ∈
Exech(Π˜), ∀sid ∈ SIdh(tr), there exist tr0 ∈ Exec
p,1(Π), sid0 ∈ SId(tr0) and bijections I :
Ix(tr, [sid]) → Ix(tr0, [sid0]), g : Ag(sid) → Ag(sid0) and ϕ : [sid] → [sid0] such that ∀sid
′ ∈
[sid], ∀i ∈ Ix(tr), f0I(i)(ϕ(sid
′)) = (σ0, r, p) with σ = σ0 ◦ g where fi(sid
′) = (σ, r, p), tr =
((fi, ·, ·))i and tr0 = ((f0j , ·, ·))j . Moreover, for these tr0, sid0 and bijections the converse also
holds, that is, ∀sid′0 ∈ SId(tr0), ∀i0 ∈ Ix(tr0), fI−1(i0)(ϕ
−1(sid′0)) = (σ, r, p) with σ = σ0 ◦ g
where f0i0(sid
′
0) = (σ0, r, p).
The proof of this lemma consists of a simple rewriting of the definition of honest traces
into the definition of honest, single session traces.
6.0.8 Sketch of proof of the main result
Firstly, Lemma 1 says that it sufficient to look at honest execution traces in the transformed
protocol. So we fix an arbitrary honest trace tr. Then Lemma 3 says that every (eventually
partial) honest protocol session in tr can be projected to a (partial) honest, single session
trace tr0 in the initial protocol. Observe that we are only interested in honest sessions of tr,
since that is what the hypothesis of the implication in φ refers to (i.e.
∧
l∈[k] NC(tr, Alς)).
But then the hypothesis of the implication in φ is trivially satisfied for passive, single sessions
in Π. Hence also the conclusion of the implication in φ is satisfied for passive, single sessions
in Π.
We consider three cases according to what the quantifier Qi is.
If it is ∃ then the there is a local state satisfying the (in)equalities simply because there
is one in the honest, single session trace tr0 (we apply again Lemma 3 to obtain the local
states in tr from those in tr0).
If Qi = ∃! we also need to prove uniqueness. From the conditions of φ we know that
there is j ∈ Ji such that τ ij ∈ {=} and in (say) u
i
j there is an occurrence of Xς with X a
nonce or a key variable. Consider an arbitrary “valid” σ (meaning that σ is a substitution
such that (σ, r, p) ∈ LSr,p(tr)). From the previous case we know that there is a valid σ′ such
that (uij = v
i
j)[
σ/ς ][
σ′/ςi ]. Suppose that there is also a valid σ
′′ such that (uij = v
i
j)[
σ/ς ][
σ′′/ςi ].
But then Xσ occurs both in Y σ′ and Y σ′′, where Y is a variable of vij such that Xς occurs in
vij under Y ςi. Since Y σ
′ and Y σ′′ are parts of sent or received messages, it follows that they
are parts of messages known by the intruder and hence Xσ is also part of a message known
by the intruder. Thus we can apply Lemma 2 and obtain that Y σ′ and Y σ′′ were sent or
received in the same honest protocol session as Xσ. And since σ′ and σ′′ are substitutions
obtained at the same control point pi of the same role ri it follows that σ
′ = σ′′ hence
uniqueness.
Finally consider Qi = ∀. This case proceeds similarly. If, by absurd, there are local
states such that the terms in some test become equal for some σ′ then it must be the case
that the corresponding session id is honest (this is again obtained using the uniqueness of
nonces created in honest sessions, that is Lemma 2). We can then project this equality in
the honest, single session trace tr0 to obtain a contradiction.
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7 Conclusions and future work
We have presented a general transformation for security protocols that essentially prevents
an active adversary to interfere with the executions of the protocol that involves only honest
parties. An important consequence of our transformation is that it enables a transference
theorem of a non-trivial class of security properties from a setting where no adversary is
present to a setting where a fully active adversary may tamper with the protocol execution.
The security properties that are transferred include secrecy and various formulations of
authentication.
One interesting avenue for future research it to obtain more general transference theorems
between the properties of the original protocol and those of the transformed protocol. It
would be also interesting to better develop the modular development approach implied by
our results. In particular, it would be interesting to develop a language for building “naive”
specification which can then be compiled into secure protocols using our transformation.
Finally, from an efficiency perspective, it is important to look for simpler transformations
that make lighter use of cryptographic primitives, perhaps at the expense of ensuring weaker
security guarantees for the resulting protocol. We note that the Katz and Yung compiler [11]
is one example of such a transformation which merits further investigation.
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A Formal Definition of Executable Protocols
In order to define executable protocols, we use another deduction relation `p which is similar
with ` but which applies on terms of the free algebra TΣ(X) (rather then Tf ). The only
differences are that now a ∈ X.a and that the second rule becomes S ` a, ek(a), vk(a) .
Definition 10 A protocol Π = (R,S) with R(r) = ((rcv1r, snt
1
r), . . . , (rcv
kr
r , snt
kr
r ) is exe-
cutable if:
1. The protocol has the executable decryption property, i.e. for all Ar ∈ X.a the only
encryption keys that are contained in terms rcvpr (for p ∈ [kr]) are ek(Ar);
2. For all r ∈ [k], all p ∈ [kr], and all Ar ∈ X.a we require that whenever rcvpr con-
tains a signature [[t]]sk(A) for some term t ∈ TΣ(X), the term t can be computed from
rcv1r, rcv
2
r, . . . , rcv
p
r ,kn(Ar) by Dolev-Yao operations, i.e. rcv
1
r, rcv
2
r , . . . , rcv
p
r ,
kn(Ar) `p t;
3. The messages that are sent are computable: for all p ∈ [kr] we require that sntpr can be
computed from rcv1r, rcv
2
r, . . . , rcv
p
r ,kn(Ar) by Dolev-Yao operations, i.e.
rcv1r, rcv
2
r, . . . , rcv
p
r ,kn(Ar) `p snt
p
r ;
4. For all r ∈ [k], all p ∈ [kr], the variables of sntpr are contained in the union of the
variables of rcv1r , . . . , rcv
p
r, X.a, and Xn(Ar);
5. the function S is injective;
6. for each r ∈ [k], there is p0 ∈ Z such that if p0 ≤ p < p0 + kr then S is defined on
(r, p) and otherwise it is undefined on (r, p).
The Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol, described in Example 1, is executable.
B Proofs of lemmas
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The following lemma, called the locality lemma, states a well-known property of the intruder
deduction systems and will be used in the proof that follows.
Lemma 4 Let S be a set of terms, u a term and pi a minimal proof of S ` u. Then all
terms occurring in the nodes of pi are in St(S, u). If the last rule of pi is a decomposition
then these terms are in St(S).
Let Π = (R,S) be an executable protocol such that there are no variable nonces N 0A
in R and the initial control points are set to 1. Let R(r) = ((rcvpr , snt
p
r))1≤p≤kr . Consider
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an arbitrary valid execution trace tr of the protocol Π˜. Let tr = (SId0, f0, H0)
α1−→ . . .
αn−−→
(SIdn, fn, Hn). We need to show that tr is an honest execution trace.
We first give a few useful definitions and properties.
For a message m we define m = m0 if m = {[m′, [[m′, p, m0]]sk′(a)]}ek′(b) for some identities
a, b, some messages m′, m0 and some p ∈ Z and m = ⊥ otherwise3. We call m0 the nonces
field4 of m.
For any transition αi = send(sid, m) such that m is accepted we have that m = r˜cv
p
rσ
where fi(sid) = (σ, r, p + 1). Suppose that p ≥ 1 and rcvpr 6= init. Then, since r˜cv
p
r = nonces,
we have that m = σ(nonces). The converse also holds, that is if m is defined then p ≥ 1 and
rcvpr 6= init.
The following property says that messages sent and accepted in the same role sessions
have the same nonces field: If sid ∈ SIdn and αi = send(sid, m) and αi′ = send(sid, m′)
are two transitions in tr such that m and m′ are accepted then m and m′ have the same
nonces field, provided it is defined for both messages. Indeed the nonces field is given by the
substitution in fi(sid) and fi′(sid) respectively (as we have seen in the previous paragraph).
And these substitution are the same on X.a ∪ X.n since they extend the substitution in
fi0(sid) with i0 < min(i, i
′) where i0 is such that SIdi0 \ SIdi0−1 = { sid } (that is, αi0 is the
new transition produced when the session sid was initiated).
Next, we define the relation ∼ between role sessions. Intuitively this relation should
capture the notion of protocol session. That is, two role sessions (·, r, ·) and (·, r′, ·) should
be in relation ∼ if and only if the two agents playing roles r and r′ are communicating in
the same protocol session.
We say that two sessions ids sid, sid′ ∈ SIdn are in relation ∼ if there are two (not
necessarily different) transitions in tr labelled by α = send(sid, m) and α′ = send(sid′, m′)
such that m and m′ are accepted, m = m′ and m 6= ⊥, that is nonces is instantiated by the
same term in the two messages m and m′.
This is relation says in fact more about two role sessions: If sid ∼ sid′ then for any two
transitions in tr labelled by α = send(sid, m) and α′ = send(sid′, m′) such that m and m′
are accepted and ⊥ /∈ {m, m′}, we have that m = m′. This is easy to verify using the above
stated property (that is, messages sent and accepted in the same role sessions have the same
nonces field). A(nother) direct consequence is that if in a session sid the agent executing
this session started the second phase (that is he received a valid message m with m 6= ⊥)
then sid ∼ sid.
But there may be sessions in which agents are still in the initialization phase. In these
sessions the messages m sent so far have no nonces field and thus the relation ∼ doesn’t
capture them (it is not “defined” on these sessions). However we are not interested in these
(role) sessions and so we do not group them into protocol sessions. But technically we need a
3Hence · is a partial function from terms to terms and ⊥ means undefined.
4The definition of frcvpr for p ≥ 1 and the following paragraph provide an explanation
for choosing this name. Recall that nonces = 〈A1, . . . , Ak,N
0
A1
,N0A2
, . . . ,N0Ak
〉 and frcvpr =
{[rcvpr , [[rcv
p
r , p
′, nonces]]sk′(A
r′
)]}ek′(Ar).
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partition, hence we simply consider the reflexive closure of ∼, denoted ∼′. This means that
those sid ∈ SIdn for which there is no transition labelled by send(sid, m), with m accepted
and m 6= ⊥, are only in relation with themselves. The relation ∼′ is clearly an equivalence
relation. We consider PrtSId to by the quotient set of SIdh(tr) by ∼′.
We prove next that the partition PrtSId satisfies the conditions in the definition of honest
executions.
Let us look at the first point of Definition 9. Consider two arbitrary session ids sid, sid′ ∈
SIdh(tr) such that sid ∼′ sid′ and sid′ 6= sid. Let sid = (s, r, (a1, . . . , ak)) and sid =
(s′, r′, (a′1, . . . , a
′
k)). By the definition of ∼ we have that there are two transitions αi =
send(sid, m) and αi′ = send(sid
′, m′) such that m and m′ have the same nonces field (be-
sides other things). Let fi(sid) = (σ, r, p + 1) and fi′(sid
′) = (σ′, r′, p′ + 1). We have that
σ(nonces) = σ′(nonces). It follows that Ajσ = Ajσ
′, that is aj = a
′
j for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k. We
know that N0Arσ = n
ar,0,s and N0Ar′σ
′ = nar′ ,0,s
′
. If r = r′ then we have in addition that
nar,0,s
′
= nar′ ,0,s
′
, thus s = s′ which is in contradiction with sid 6= sid′. Hence r 6= r′.
Finally, we prove the second point of Definition 9. Let i be the index of the analyzed
transition αi = send(sid, m) with sid ∈ SId
h(tr), m accepted, m 6= fake and m = r˜cv
p
rσ,
where fi(sid) = (σ, r, p + 1).
Since tr is a valid trace, Hi−1 ` r˜cv
p
rσ holds. Consider a minimal proof associated with
this deduction. We have r˜cv
p
r = {[rcv
p
r , [[rcv
p
r , p
′′, nonces]]sk′(Ar′′ )]}ek′(Ar) where (r
′′, p′′) =
S(r, p). Since sid ∈ SIdh(tr) it follows that Ar′′σ is a non-corrupted agent. Hence Hi−1 0
σ(sk′(Ar′′)). Thus the message m1 =σ([[rcv
p
r , p
′′,
nonces]]sk′(Ar′′ )) was not obtained by a composition rule. Thus, in both cases: m obtained
by a composition rule or by a decomposition rule, it follows that m1 is a subterm of a
term t′ in Hi−1. The term t
′ was sent at some previous step. Thus there is i′ ≤ i and
sid′ ∈ SIdn such that αi′ = send(sid
′, m′) for some m′ = r˜cv
p′
r′σ
′ and t′ = s˜nt
p′
r′σ
′ where
fi′(sid
′) = (σ′, r′, p′ + 1). Suppose i′ is the smallest such index, that is m1 is not a subterm
of a term of Hi′−1. We can then have two possibilities.
In the first one, m1 is a subterm of snt
p′
r′σ
′. Since sntp
′
r′ cannot contain the signature sk
′(·)
(the source protocol is constructed over Σ), m1 is a subterm of Xσ
′ where X is a variable of
snt
p′
r′ . Hence m1 is also a subterm of rcv
p′
r′σ
′ and moreover a subterm of m′ = r˜cv
p′
r′σ
′. But
we have that Hi′−1 ` m
′. Consider m′1 be the signed component of m
′. Again m′1 can be
obtained only by a decomposition rule. Hence again by the locality lemma, m′1 is a subterm
of a term of Hi′−1. But m1 is a subterm of m
′
1. We have thus obtained a contradiction (i is
not the smallest index such that m1 is a subterm of a term of H) which means this case
doesn’t occur.
In the second possibility, m1 = [[snt
p′
r′ , p
′, nonces]]sk′(Ar′ )σ
′. It follows that noncesσ =
noncesσ′ which implies that sid ∼ sid′. We also have p′ = p′′. From Ar′′σ = Ar′σ
′ we obtain
that r′ = r′′. Let r′d, p
′
d be such that S(r
′
d, p
′
d) = (r
′, p′). They exists and are unique by
the definition of executable protocols. But since S(r, p) = (r′′, p′′) and (r′′, p′′) = (r′, p′) it
follows that r′d = r and p
′
d = p. Finally, since also snt
p′
r′σ
′ = rcvprσ, we obtain that m = s˜nt
p′
r′ .
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B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. First, note that all terms t ∈ H are equal to s˜nt
p
rσ
′ for some f ′, sid′, r and p
with f ′(sid′) = (σ′, r, p + 1) and if p ≥ 1 and rcvpr 6= init then these terms are of the form
{[m′, [[m′, p, σ′(nonces)]]sk′(a)]}ek′(b). Second, remark that it is sufficient to prove the desired
property for all t ∈ H . The generalization to deducible messages follows easily. Hence it is
sufficient to prove that whenever Xσ occurs in some s˜nt
p
rσ
′ then rcvpr 6= init, p ≥ 1 and sid
′
is an honest session id.
Let tr = (SId0, f0, H0)
α1−→ . . .
αn−−→ (SIdn, fn, Hn) be a trace of Π˜ and X be a variable of
Π. We suppose without loss of generality that X = N jAr for some r ∈ [k] and j > 0. Take
(SId, f, H) an arbitrary global state of tr and let i be the index of this global state in tr.
Consider an honest session id sid ∈ SIdh(tr) and let sid = (s0, r0, ·) and f(sid) = (σ, r0, ·).
We prove first that N jArσ is a nonce created in an honest session.
If r = r0 then we have that N
j
Ar
σ = nar,j,s. Suppose r 6= r0. This means that N
j
Ar
was not initialized in sid by a new transition but by a αi0 = send(sid, m) transition with
i0 < i, m accepted, m 6= init and p0 ≥ 1, where fi0(sid) = (σ0, r0, p0 + 1). We have
N jArσ = N
j
Ar
σ0. Let (r1, p1) = S(r0, p0). Since tr is an honest trace (by Lemma 1), there
are sid1 ∈ [sid] and i1 < i0 such that fi1(sid1) = (σ1, r1, p1 +1) for some substitution σ1. We
have N jArσ0 = N
j
Ar
σ1. If r = r1 then N
j
Ar
σ1 = n
ar,j,s1 where sid1 = (s1, r1, ·). Otherwise,
continuing in the same way for at most i steps we will certainly find some index l, 0 ≤ l < k
such that r = rl (this is because there are k different roles). Hence anyhow N
j
Ar
σsid = n
ar ,j,sl .
To ease the notation we denote it by n.
If Hi = Hi−1 then it is sufficient to prove the property for i− 1. Hence consider that i
is such that Hi \Hi−1 6= ∅. It follows that αi = send(sid
′, m) for some sid′ ∈ SIdi (clearly
αi 6= corrupt since H1 0 n). Also m = r˜cv
p
rσ
′ where fi(sid
′) = (σ′, r, p + 1).
We reason by induction on i.
Suppose that i is the smallest index such that n occurs in a term of Hi. It follows that
n ∈ St(s˜nt
p
rσ
′). Then n ∈ St(Y σ′) where Y is a variable of s˜nt
p
r .
If Y is not a variable of r˜cv
p
r then from the definition of executable protocols we know
that Y σ′ is a new nonce or key, or an agent identity. Hence Y = N j
′
Ar
or Kj
′
Ar
or A′ for some
j′ and A′. That is, Y σ′ is a constant just like n; thus Y σ′ = n. Since n = nar,j,sl it follows
that Arσ
′ = ar, j = j
′ and sid′ = (sl, r, ·). Hence sid
′ = sidl. This means that sid
′ is an
honest session id. Suppose p < 1. Then Y = N 0Ar and thus j = 0 which is a contradiction.
Hence p ≥ 1 and thus in this case the property is true.
Otherwise, if Y is a variable of r˜cv
p
r then n ∈ St(r˜cv
p
rσ
′), that is n ∈ St(m). Since
Hi−1 ` m, it follows that n ∈ St(Hi−1), which is in contradiction with i being the smallest
index such that n ∈ St(Hi).
Suppose now that i is arbitrary. We have n ∈ St(Hi ∪ {s˜nt
p
rσ
′}). For the occurrence of
n in Hi−1 then the conclusion follows by induction hypothesis. Consider an occurrence of
n in s˜nt
p
rσ
′. If n occurs in Y σ′ where Y is not a variable of r˜cv
p
r then, as in the previous
paragraph, the conclusion simply follows. Suppose that n occurs in Y σ where Y is a variable
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of r˜cv
p
r . Then n occurs in m. Since m is deducible from Hi−1 and in Hi−1 all occurrences of
n are as required by the induction hypothesis, it follows that the same thing happens in m.
That is, m = m′′[s˜nt
p′
r′σ
′′] and n occurs in s˜nt
p′
r′σ
′′ where fi(sid
′′) = (σ′′, r′, p′ + 1) for some
honest session sid′′ ∈ SIdi and p′ ≥ 1. If the occurrence of s˜nt
p′
r′σ
′′ in m = r˜cv
p
rσ
′ is in Y σ′
then the conclusion follows, as this means that s˜nt
p′
r′σ
′′ occurs in s˜nt
p
rσ
′. Otherwise it must
be the case that m = s˜nt
p′
r′σ
′′. Then σ′(nonces) = σ′′(nonces). And since sid′′ is an honest
session id and p′ ≥ 1 we obtain that also sid′ is also an honest session id and p ≥ 1.
C Proof of Theorem 1
Consider an arbitrary security property φ ∈ L′ such that Π |=p,1 φ.
Let tr ∈ Exec(Π˜) = (SIdι, fι, Hι)1≤ι≤n. From Lemma 1 we know that tr ∈ Exec
h(Π˜).
Also let (σ, r, p) ∈ LSr,p(tr) such that NC(tr, σ(Al)) holds for all 1 ≤ l ≤ k. Hence there
are an index ι with 1 ≤ ι ≤ n and a session id sid ∈ SId(tr) such that fι(sid) = (σ, r, p).
Moreover, sid ∈ SIdh(tr). We can suppose that ι ∈ Ix(tr, sid) because otherwise it would be
easy to find another index which has this property.
Applying Lemma 3 we obtain that there are tr0 ∈ Exec
p,1(Π), sid0 ∈ SId(tr) and bijections
I : Ix(tr, [sid]) → Ix(tr0, [sid0]), g : Ag(sid) → Ag(sid0) and ϕ : [sid] → [sid0] satisfying certain
properties. In particular, if we let sid1 = ϕ(sid) and ι0 = I(ι) then we have f0ι0(sid1) =
(σ0, r, p) with σ = σ0 ◦ g.
Also, since tr0 is an honest, single session trace by its definition, we have that sid1 is an
honest session id. Then NC(tr0, σ0(Al)) is true for all 1 ≤ l ≤ k. From the hypothesis we
know that [[φ(tr0)]] = 1. Hence, since the left hand side of the implication holds it follows
that also the right hand side holds for tr0 and (σ0, r, p) ∈ LSr,p(tr0), that is for ι0 and sid1.
Fix an arbitrary i. What we have to prove depends on the form of the subformula in the
right hand side of the implication.
Consider first that Qi = ∃. Since [[φ(tr0)]] = 1, there exist ι′0 in Ix(tr0, [sid1]) and sid
′
0 ∈
SId(tr0) such that the formulas τ
i
j (u
i
j , v
i
j)[
σ0/ς ][
σ′0/ς′ ] hold for all j ∈ Ji, where f
0
ι′0
(sid′0) =
(σ′0, ri, pi). Let ι
′ = I−1(ι′0) and sid
′ = ϕ−1(sid′0). Again by Lemma 3 we have that
fι′(sid
′) = (σ′, ri, pi) with σ
′ = σ′0 ◦ g. Since σ, σ
′ are equal with σ0, σ
′
0 respectively, modulo
the same bijective renaming g of agent identities, then it follows easily that τ ij (u
i
j , v
i
j)[
σ/ς ][
σ′/ςi ]
are true for all j ∈ Ji. Hence the formula ∃LSri,pi(tr).ςi
∧
j∈Ji
τ ij (u
i
j , v
i
j) is true.
Consider now that Qi = ∃!. The existence of ι′ and sid
′ is assured as in the previous
paragraph. Let ς(X) with X a nonce (or key) variable be a subterm in uij or v
i
j for some
j ∈ Ji with τ ij ∈ {=}.
Concerning uniqueness, assume there exist sid′′ ∈ SId(tr) and ι′′ ∈ Ix(tr) such that, in
particular (uij = v
i
j)[
σ/ς ][
σ′′/ςi ], where fι′′ = (σ
′′, ri, pi). Consider an occurrence of ς(X) say
in uij , at position q. There is an occurrence q
′ in vij with q
′ ≤ q such that (vij)|q′ = ς(Y ) or
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(vij)|q′ = ςi(Y ) where Y is a variable. Since we have uniqueness in the passive, single session
case then (vij)|q′ = ςi(Y ). Hence Xσ occurs in both Y σ
′ and Y σ′′.
If Y was received in session sid′′ then there is an action αι′′1 = send(sid
′′, m) such that
m = r˜cv
p′
ri
θ′, fι′′1 (sid
′′) = (θ′, ri, p
′ + 1), fι′′1−1(sid
′′) = (θ, ri, p
′) and θ was not defined on
Y . We also have σ′′ extends θ hence in particular Y σ′′ = Y θ. If Y was created (i.e. was
initialized by a new action) in sid′′ then it was also sent within some message m = s˜nt
p′
ri
θ,
again with σ′′ extending θ. In both cases, since m is deducible from the intruder’s knowledge
and Xσ occurs in m we can apply now Lemma 2 to obtain that sid′′ is an honest session
id and σ′′(nonces) = σ(nonces). If Y was also received in session sid′ then we can prove
similarly that σ′(nonces) = σ(nonces). Intuitively, different role sessions can’t be played
by the same role (i.e. ri) in the same protocol session hence sid
′ = sid′′. Formally, this is
obtained from the equality N0Ari
σ′ = N0Ari
σ′′ taking into account that N0Ari
was initialized
in both sessions.
Finally consider that Qi = ∀.
Suppose that there are ι′ and sid′ such that τ ij (u
i
j , v
i
j)[
σ/ς ][
σ′/ςi ] does not hold for some
j ∈ Ji where fι′(sid
′) = (σ′, ri, pi). That is (u
i
j = v
i
j)[
σ/ς ][
σ′/ςi ]. Let ς(X) with X a nonce
(or key) variable be a subterm in uij (the case v
i
j is symmetric). Then, as before Xσ occurs
in Y σ′′ where σ′′ = σ or σ′′ = σ′. If σ′′ = σ′ then again using Lemma 2 it follows that
sid′ is an honest session and σ′(nonces) = σ(nonces). Hence sid′ ∈ [sid]. Let ι′0 = I(ι
′) and
sid′0 = ϕ(sid
′
0). We have (from Lemma 3 again) that σ
′ = σ′0 ◦ g. Hence (u
i
j = v
i
j)[
σ0/ς ][
σ′0/ςi ]
which is a contradiction with the hypothesis for tr0, ι0 and σ0. Hence the supposition made
is false.
D Authentication properties
In this section we show how to use the logic defined in Section 4 to formally capture several
authentication definitions proposed by Lowe [13]. For each property we give the informal
definition and the corresponding formalisation in our logic.
In all the formulas below, we let p be the length of A’s role.
D.1 Aliveness
Lowe’s definition of aliveness:
“We say that a protocol guarantees to an initiator A aliveness of another agent B
if, whenever A (acting as an initiator) completes a run of the protocol, apparently
with responder B, then B has previously been running the protocol.”
And the corresponding formula:
φ1(tr) , ∀LS1,p(tr).ς (NC(tr, Aς) ∧ NC(tr, Bς) ⇒ ∃LSr,1(tr).ς
′ (Bς = Bς ′))
INRIA
Synthesizing secure protocols 31
D.2 Weak agreement
Lowe’s definition of weak agreement:
“We say that a protocol guarantees to an initiator A weak agreement of another
agent B if, whenever A (acting as an initiator) completes a run of the protocol,
apparently with responder B, then B has previously been running the protocol,
apparently with A.”
And the corresponding formula:
φ2(tr) , ∀LS1,p(tr).ς
(
NC(tr, Aς) ∧ NC(tr, Bς) ⇒
∃LSr,1(tr).ς
′ (Bς = Bς ′) ∧ (Aς = Aς ′)
)
D.3 Non-injective agreement
Lowe’s definition of non-injective agreement:
“We say that a protocol guarantees to an initiator A non-injective agreement of
another agent B on a set of data items ds (where ds is a set of a set of free
variables appearing in the protocol description) if, whenever A (acting as an
initiator) completes a run of the protocol, apparently with responder B, then
B has previously been running the protocol, apparently with A, and B was
acting as responder in his run, and the two agents agreed on the data values
corresponding to all the variables of ds.”
And the corresponding formula:
φ3(tr) , ∀LS1,p(tr).ς (NC(tr, Aς) ∧ NC(tr, Bς) ⇒
∃LS2,1(tr).ς
′ (Bς = Bς ′) ∧ (Aς = Aς ′) ∧
∧
1≤i≤n
(Xiς = Xiς
′))
where ds = {X1, . . . , Xn}.
D.4 (Injective) Agreement
Lowe’s definition of (injective) agreement:
“We say that a protocol guarantees to an initiator A agreement of another agent
B on a set of data items ds if, whenever A (acting as an initiator) completes a
run of the protocol, apparently with responder B, then B has previously been
running the protocol, apparently with A, and B was acting as responder in
his run, and the two agents agreed on the data values corresponding to all the
variables of ds and each such run of A corresponds to a unique run of B.”
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And the corresponding formula:
φ4(tr) , ∀LS1,p(tr).ς (NC(tr, Aς) ∧ NC(tr, Bς) ⇒
∃!LS2,1(tr).ς
′ (Bς = Bς ′) ∧ (Aς = Aς ′) ∧
∧
1≤i≤n
(Xiς = Xiς
′))
where ds = {X1, . . . , Xn}.
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